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Andrew f litwin wamu investments forex morning trade system forum

Andrew f litwin wamu investments

AS: If you compare the deals that were done today to the first wave, which are in some of the earlier buildings, the rents have certainly tripled. TRD: How much of a role did the fact that Gracious Home had already signed across the street impact your ability to convince tenants to sign here? AS: Sixth Avenue is converging from both ways. Most of the blocks have been developed, with a few exceptions.

The real void is between 28th and 32nd Streets. Hopefully, as all those projects come online, it will be one continuous stretch. Located at the corner of Morgan Street, directly across the street from the new Trump Plaza residential development, the retail space presents an exciting opportunity to cater to this evolving neighborhood and would prove an ideal location for a restaurant with outdoor seating. It is positioned at the center of a dense residential and commercial area.

In recent years the area has experienced a surge in residential development. Retailers have followed their lead, catering to both office workers and residents. After 25 years City Sports has grown into an award winning specialty sports retailer in metropolitan locations along the east coast. As implied by the name, City Sports stores are located on the best streets in some of the best cities.

RKF is currently marketing the remaining 3, square feet to specialty and service retailers. The retail space in the building fronts on Church Street. Starbucks was drawn to the neighborhood because of the significant residential growth and business expansion taking place in the area. Tribeca is one of the fastest growing residential neighborhoods in New York City. About Tourneau Tourneau is recognized as the undisputed authority in the watch industry.

The new assignments are at Lafayette Street and Bowery. The space encompasses 5, square feet on the Ground Floor and Lower Level. The increase in residential and hotel development has had a positive impact on popular neighborhood establishments significantly increasing their patronage. The available retail space consists of 3, square feet on the Ground Floor, 3, square feet on the Second Floor and 4, square feet on the Third Floor. The building is located in the Bowery section of Manhattan on the East block between East Third and Fourth Streets and features 43 feet of frontage on the Bowery.

The Bowery has undergone a significant transformation in recent years from a historically quiet neighborhood with primarily local retailers, restaurants and bars to a more exciting and active hour retail environment.

The area is a haven for luxury condo and hotel developments, restaurants, retail, the arts and nightlife. The dancewear retailer will occupy 2, square feet on the northeast corner of 69th Street. The surrounding neighborhoods have experienced explosive growth recently with new residential developments attracting young affluent residents.

Situated on the North side of 14th Street between Sixth and Seventh Avenues at the base of brand new luxury condominium building, West 14th Street presents the opportunity to take advantage of tremendous pedestrian traffic seven days a week. It is situated in Midtown at the base of a story boutique residential condominium building designed by the Office of Philip Johnson and Alan Ritchie Architects. The building is ocated in the North side of the block between Fifth and Madison Avenues and is across the street from the Cornell Club.

Neighboring retailers include Brooks Brothers, Cipriani, J. The space encompasses 50, square feet on the ground floor, lower level, second and third floors. The building is located in the Gramercy section of Manhattan on the northwest corner of 20th Street and boasts 90 feet of frontage on Park Avenue South. The available retail space is comprised of approximately 5, square feet on the ground level with ceiling heights of 17 feet, plus over 5, square feet of selling space on the lower level with ceiling heights of 10 feet, in addition there is the potential to add Mezzanine space.

The space is located on the west block between West 3rd Street and Minetta Lane and includes 1, square feet on the ground floor and 1, square feet in the basement. The list, especially higher up, contains those who animate the deals and the trends. They are the deciders and the money providers. They make the real estate world the rest of us live in; or cover, as the case may be. This criterion explains why some people were obvious picks financiers like No.

However capable and ingenious in the commissioned service of those spending the capital, brokers are facilitators for the likes of Messrs. Durst and Speyer or of Messrs. De Niro and Egan, for that matter. They are not the initiators. The same holds for public officials, including the mighty Michael Bloomberg No.

They seem to be at their best for real estate either facilitating its development or standing clear of its ascendancy. That is, obstructionist or helper; and Mr. And Ms. Lenz, the broker, was the highest-ranking woman in private industry. She was joined by just eight other women. There were, however, a fair amount of almost-from-nothing entrepreneurs splashed across the list: Lockhart Steele, No.

Futterman claims. Clip 1. Clip 2. Both retailers are relocating from their current locations. The retail condominium is situated at the base of the Maison East, a story luxury residential condominium, located on the west block of Third Avenue between 81st and 82nd Streets.

The 14, square feet of retail space is fully leased to Boom Gym and Sure Foot. Maison East experienced record sales, and only has a few units remaining. The division specializes in developing and executing investment strategies for buyers and sellers of all types of retail driven assets.

The firm is fast emerging as a leader in all aspects of investment sales in New York City as well as nationwide. Howard Gilbert, formerly a senior managing director, is a veteran retail leasing broker with over 30 years of experience representing both retailers and landlords. He has also served as the exclusive leasing agent for an equally impressive list of landlords including Solow Management Company, Kipp-Stawski Management Corp. Joshua Strauss, formerly a managing director, specializes in landlord and tenant representation in the New York Metropolitan area and key downtown markets throughout the United States.

Located at James P. Casey Road, the acre complex is formerly a General Motors manufacturing plant, which was vacated in the mids. Firestone Building Products Co. RKF Investment Sales and Advisory Services specializes in developing and executing investment strategies for buyers and sellers of all types of retail driven assets. Formerly a senior managing director, Mr. Schuster has been with RKF since and specializes in tenant representation, landlord representation and investment sales in Manhattan, and tenant representation for a few tenants nationally.

Schuster represents an impressive list of institutional and entrepreneurial property owners including Edward J. At Greenwich Street, Mr. He is currently marketing more than , square feet of space for property owners, which includes space at East 57th Street, Broadway, Bowery, 55 Broadway, Eighth Avenue and Fifth Avenue. His recent investment sales accomplishments include the sale of the 1. Schuster graduated magna cum laude from Tulane University, earning a Bachelor of Science. Who are these people?

Retail stores are economic generators and also create exciting streetscapes and destinations. The Meatpacking District was simply a blighted industrial area without the luxury shops while Times Square was simply an area of ill repute. Among its , feet of current assignments, Futterman oversees leasing for The Plaza Retail Collection, leading the team responsible for merchandising the retail, restaurant and banquet space, and introducing and positioning the space for lease in the market.

Situated between Prince and Spring Streets, Mercer Street is a five-story, 11,square-foot building that is currently vacant. The building has received approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission to build a 1,square-foot penthouse addition for a total of 12, square feet. Situated in the heart of the prestigious SoHo retail corridor, Mercer is surrounded by some of the most recognized luxury and aspirational retail brands, including Prada, Agent Provocateur, Kate Spade, Vivienne Tam and Ben Sherman.

Formerly a senior vice president, Ms. Bellantoni has been with RKF since She is considered one of the leading retail leasing professionals in the New York Metro area, with more than 25 years of experience in retail, retail leasing and merchandising. Her current specialty is tenant and landlord representation in Manhattan and most major markets throughout the United States, with primary focus on luxury and aspirational retail clients and properties.

Crew to name a few. Bellantoni also secured two new Manhattan flagship locations for Apple, a new location for J. Bellantoni represents an equally few impressive list of institutional and entrepreneurial property owners. She is currently marketing , square feet of space for property owners including West 14th Street, West 14th Street , West Broadway and Chelsea Market.

Prior to joining RKF in , Ms. Drugstore retailer Duane Reade will occupy 17, square feet — 3, square feet on the ground floor and 14, square feet in the basement and Paramount Electronics, a gift and electronics retailer will occupy 2, square feet on the ground floor. Schuster also represented Paramount Electronics. Madison owns, develops, operates and manages a diverse portfolio of real estate assets.

Our focus in on acquiring and operating urban mixed-use retail, residential and office properties. Further information can be found at www. Long Island City boasts heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic with , vehicles passing by daily and an annual subway ridership of more than five million people. About Brause Realty Inc. Founded in , Brause Realty Inc. See www. The property features 17, square feet of retail space — 8, square feet on the ground floor and 8, square feet in the basement — with 34 feet of frontage on Pine Avenue and 80 feet on Third Street.

Neighboring retailers include Starbucks, P. The Bowery area is undergoing a transformation to an active environment with new high-end hotels and residential developments including Avalon, Chyristie Place, 40 Bond and 25 Bond as well as a new Whole Foods Market and The New Museum of Contemporary Art. The leasing team is in the process of marketing the remaining 84, square feet of available retail space at the property, and is currently in lease negotiations with several leading national retailers to lease space at the property.

Ownership is redeveloping and repositioning the ,square-foot shopping center. The first phase of construction is underway with occupancy slated for mid A ,square-foot Fortunoff store and a ,square-foot JCPenney anchor the property, and are among the top-producing stores in the chain, drawing customers from more than 20 miles away.

The trendy apparel retailer will occupy 1, square feet on the ground floor. With convenient subway access to all points throughout the city, the retail space is also situated in close proximity to a new 66,square-foot Whole Foods Market and many other new residential developments.

The area is experiencing tremendous growth with new hotels, office and residential projects coming on line including the Standard Hotel by Andre Balaazs, the High Line, the anticipated 1. Citibabes currently operates a 10,square-foot space located at Broadway in the fashionable SoHo district.

The exclusive, members-only club is seeking similar size locations in affluent, family-friendly neighborhoods. Gilbert and Associate Chad Sidkoff are marketing the retail space on behalf of ownership, 6th Ave. Located on Sixth Avenue between 36th and 37th Streets, at the convergence of Midtown South and Herald Square, the retail space offers 3, square feet on the ground floor, 1, square feet on the mezzanine and an additional 1, square feet in the basement. From hotels to shops to home sales to blogs to skyline-changing developments, these personalities animate Gotham real estate.

One of Robert K. Gordon, and his longtime client, the GAP. Take Mr. As Mr. Crew and Steve Madden shoes. Developers are scrambling to turn the Bowery, which runs diagonally through the East Village and Chinatown, into the latest trendy corridor for luxury goods and entertainment. Shortly after Sept. The new New Museum will open for the first time this weekend, with 30 consecutive hours of free admission starting at noon Saturday. The museum building dwarfs the neighboring low-rise brick buildings, which include a vacant restaurant supply store and a padlocked budget hotel called the Sunshine Motel.

Such vestiges of the old neighborhood will probably remain for a while. There is a methadone clinic nearby, and a handful of homeless shelters are left. But several developers insist that is a good thing. Moss has been criticized by local residents for building a structure that is much taller than the four- and five-story brick buildings that have lined the avenue since the 19th century.

Moss said he expected to open the hotel by early next summer. He has not yet set rates for the rooms, which will include a penthouse suite. That hotel has reunited two longtime local partnerships. Born said the hushed oak-paneled lobby was meant to evoke the Bowery of the turn of the last century.

But the building is new. It was nearing completion three years ago as a much more modest project, with a mixture of apartments and dormitories, when the original developers lost their building permit. Born said. So they bought out the nearly finished project and stripped it bare. He said the hotel owed its Old World charm to the interior design skills of Mr.

McPherson and Mr. Down the block, AvalonBay Communities, a residential real estate investment trust based in Washington, has created a vast complex of luxury rental apartments and retail space clustered around the intersection of Bowery and Houston Street. Once, the only places nearby to buy groceries were the neighborhood bodegas.

It has apartments. Avalon has kept the name, although this building is actually one block off the Bowery, on the northwest corner of Second Avenue and First Street. The Bowery has been home to several legendary performance spaces. But now only the Amato, a plucky opera company in its 60th season, is still operating there. Karen Bellantoni, the broker at Robert K. Bellantoni is also representing the retail space in the Bouwerie Lane Theater building, at the northwest corner of Bond Street.

He is renovating the top two floors for his own residence. He plans to turn the middle two levels into full-floor condominiums. And he plans to lease out the first two floors for retailing. This building, which has landmark status, has an unusual cast-iron exterior in the French Second Empire style. Gordon said he wanted to restore the exterior as much as possible to its original condition.

Gordon said. But there is still an infrastructure that is always going to keep the Bowery a little funky. To that end, Mr. Gordon said that he would not allow retail space in his new building to be rented for chain stores or A. He said he would prefer to rent to art galleries or design shops. To be known simply as 72nd and Broadway www. It will offer retailers extraordinary visibility and exposure with foot high ground floor ceilings and glass storefronts with feet of wraparound frontage.

The property will benefit from the subway station across the street, which is one of the most heavily trafficked in the city and boasts an annual ridership of The Upper West Side is one of the most affluent and vibrant neighborhoods in Manhattan. The types of tenants being drawn to 72nd and Broadway, added Futterman, are aspirational brands — from the fashion, home furnishing and technology worlds.

This spectacular retail space will sit at the base of a story luxury rental tower, being developed by The Gotham Organization. Construction on Broadway is expected to be complete by fourth quarter The space is at the base of a story residential condominium building and offers 4, square feet on the ground floor, 1, square feet on the mezzanine, 4, on the lower level and 80 feet of frontage.

Krieger, who previously was a director, has seven years experience in retail real estate. Among his recent accomplishments, Mr. Krieger graduated from American University, with a bachelors of science. The high-end handbag and leather goods retailer has opened a 1, square-foot store at the base of the historic story Class A office building in the Plaza District.

It will also showcase the delicacies of noodle specialist Wai Ming Cheng in a modern noodle bar on the casino floor. The Cosmopolitan will offer a total of , square feet of retail space, a 2, hotel, condo-hotel and suite accommodations managed by the Grand Hyatt and an 80,square-foot casino.

The retail space is divided between , square feet and will feature a collection of eclectic retail stores and boutique tenants, and approximately , square feet of exquisite dining choices, all with easy access from the five story underground parking garage. Satisfying the demand for a lifestyle experience, The Cosmopolitan will offer a mix of boutique distinction, urban design and technological advancement, with a very unique personality.

The Cosmopolitan will feature 2, condo-hotel and hotel rooms set inside two foot-tall towers. The towers are perched atop a four-level, foot-tall lower podium. The Cosmopolitan has approached the design of the shops and restaurants in a completely integrated fashion. Unlike traditional Las Vegas landscapes, retail is at the front door providing millions of people with direct access from both Las Vegas Boulevard and Harmon Avenue.

With unprecedented views of the Las Vegas Strip, guests, visitors and condo-hotel owners will literally be surrounded by the icons that make Las Vegas such an exciting and sought after destination. For more information, visit cosmolv. New York, NY — R. Companies, will jointly handle the retail leasing for its premier residential development, One Brooklyn Bridge Park.

The retail space at One Brooklyn Bridge Park is ideal for a prepared food operator, restaurateur, cafe and grocery, in addition to more traditional specialty retail. The site is adjacent to the soon-to-be constructed acre Brooklyn Bridge Park, which will include playgrounds, playing fields, kayaking, fishing, and lushly landscaped gardens transforming this stretch of prime waterfront that until now has been inaccessible.

The 2, 3, 4, 5, N, R, A and C subway lines and major Brooklyn bus routes are within walking distance, making the retail space convenient for both residents and visitors. About Spandrel Property Services, Inc. Spandrel Property Services, Inc. Formed in and based in New York City Spandrel has accumulated over two million total square feet of assets under management and leasing exclusives nationwide, including both corporate and third party owned properties.

The firm works with new developers in monitoring the development process, leasing or selling available units, and managing and maintaining first class assets. It also takes over currently active and operating properties for Third parties. Spandrel is licensed and manages properties in New York, Pennsylvania and Colorado. With three Paris boutiques, a U. The retailer plans to open an estimated four locations over the next year, with store sizes ranging between 1, and 1, square feet.

The trendy retailer, popular with celebrities, is the go-to brand for women who thrive on inner personalities and have clear, daring fashion instincts. Sophisticated cocktail dresses, sultry sequined minis and sassy separates, Diabless redefines a devoted and yet, defiant, opinion of fashion.

The brand illustrates their take on the temperamental school-girl, the Parisian sophisticate and the glam rock socialite. Feld specializes in both owner and tenant representation in the greater Los Angeles market. Most recently, he served as national real estate manager for Styles for Less, an apparel retailer, where he was responsible for site selection, lease acquisition and development strategy, successfully securing 50 locations nationally.

Marshall was with Davita, Inc. Sande most recently served as vice president of real estate for bebe Stores, Inc. At bebe, Ms. Previously, she served as senior director of real estate for Polo Ralph Lauren, where she successfully executed the national roll-out of Club Monaco.

Prior to that, Ms. Sande spent seven years with The Wet Seal, Inc. RKF worked with Ms. RKF will continue to assist the retailer with its national expansion effort. RKF Strategic Retailer Services assists retailers in developing and executing strategic plans — including regional and national expansions, customer and market analysis, and site selection. Always a mecca for high-end retailers, Madison Avenue is now attracting a dazzling array of jewelers that are opening new boutiques or occupying larger quarters.

Most of the recent burst of development is taking place on a short stretch of the avenue, from 61st through 64th Streets. Two of them — Ivanka Trump, a venture by and named for the older daughter of Donald Trump, and Kwiat Diamonds, a wholesaler — are opening their first stores anywhere. Leviev, an Israeli diamond trader that entered the retail business for the first time last year in London, is opening its first United States boutique.

Kentshire, a dealer in antique jewelry and furniture, will sublet space from Leviev. Two other jewelers — Chopard, the Swiss watch and jewelry dealer, and Graff, the British diamond merchant — are already on Madison Avenue, but they have outgrown their existing quarters and are moving to larger spaces. And Asprey, the British seller of jewelry and other luxury goods, has moved farther north, to a new, albeit smaller, store at Madison Avenue, between 70th and 71st Streets. These are among about 50 jewelry specialists on Madison Avenue within its Business Improvement District, which runs from 57th Street to 86th Street.

Stephen Russell, a dealer in antique, estate and contemporary jewelry, is moving next month from a square-foot store at Madison Avenue to an 1,square-foot shop four doors away at Madison Avenue, on the southwest corner of 76th Street. Madison Avenue offers many attractions. Bellantoni said. Trump, principal of Ivanka Trump and vice president for real estate development and acquisitions for the Trump Organization, opened her shop on Monday, in partnership with the Dynamic Diamond Corporation, a wholesaler.

The store occupies 1, square feet at Madison Avenue, between 61st and 62nd Streets. Leviev is to open a 4,square-foot shop at Madison Avenue, between 62nd and 63rd Streets, next month; it is renting a landmark s building and subleasing some space to other tenants, including Kentshire, whose 3,square-foot store will open in November.

Currently at Madison Avenue, Chopard will move next month to Madison Avenue, the former Timberland store at the southeast corner of 63rd Street. Its selling space will increase to 3, square feet from square feet, said Marc Hruschka, president and chief executive of Chopard Inc.

The store will have two floors of selling space, with inch flat screens to show videos of merchandise and events that Chopard sponsors. This will have selling spaces of 1, square feet on the ground floor and square feet on the mezzanine. Graff, which now occupies an square-foot shop at Madison Avenue, is to move into its new quarters next summer.

Kwiat, a family-run wholesaler, decided to open a boutique when it celebrated its th anniversary this year. It will sell from both the ground floor and a mezzanine. Asprey moved into its store, once part of Yves St. It has about 3, square feet of selling space on the ground floor for jewelry, and 4, square feet on the second floor for luxury goods like silver and exotic animal skins.

Shortly after Asprey was bought by United States asset management companies in , it vacated its 20,square-foot, three-floor store in Trump Tower, where it had been a tenant since All of the jewelers said they were glad to be close to their competitors, a situation that Ralph Destino, chairman of the Gemological Institute of America, also deemed beneficial. Clustering tends to focus consumers on the category; it leads to commercial success for everyone.

Wenzel has more than 10 years of experience working in retail leasing and development. In his new position, he will be responsible for the leasing of lifestyle retail projects and retail components of mixed-use developments totaling more than four million square feet in markets including Miami, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Naples, FL to name a few. Wenzel was the founder and president of Elite Development Group, Inc. Harding was vice president and director of marketing for Restaurant Associates as well as the Compass Group.

Christopher Richards has joined RKF as director, consulting services. Richards will work with targeted retailers to develop comprehensive expansion strategies. Marc Turkewitz joined as director specializing in landlord and tenant representation. Turkewitz has extensive experience representing luxury retailers including Curve, a Los Angeles-based celebrity-driven boutique, Montmarte and Zibetto Espresso Bar. Previously, he was an associate with CB Richard Ellis.

Kleinberg specializes in retail leasing with a concentration in owner and tenant representation throughout the New York Metropolitan area. Jason Amirian joined RKF as an associate specializing in landlord and tenant representation in Manhattan. Prior to RKF, Mr. Amirian was associate director at Lansco where he provided strategic real estate services to office and retail tenants. While at Lansco, he secured a 3,square-foot retail space for Madison Menswear in Lower Manhattan and an office space for a hedge fund in Midtown.

Stephen Asch, senior vice president of RKF, will be responsible for devising a comprehensive real estate strategy for the restaurant. Over the next 18 months, the retailer plans to open six to eight retail locations in urban and suburban settings along the eastern coastline. The new restaurants will range between 6, and 8, square feet. For more information about Legal Sea Foods and its locations, please visit www.

The game was held at Heckscher Field in Central Park. Robert K. The league was structured with six regular season games and a three-game playoff schedule, with RKF finishing 4 and 1 in the regular season. With more than 24 years of experience in retail leasing, Mr. Cohen has arranged numerous transactions in New York City and other major markets throughout the U. RKF serves a broad spectrum of domestic and global clients in services ranging from national tenant and owner representation to advisory, consulting and disposition.

For more information visit www. The company is involved in everything from retail consulting to investment sales to the leasing of high-end lifestyle centers and mixed-use projects nationwide. The company quickly gained business and attention from tenants and landlords as it developed a reputation for being a fair player to either party. Today, if a retailer is looking for space in New York City, most people are going to run across RKF on one or both sides of the table.

But in addition to being the largest retail brokerage in New York City, RKF is also the largest retail-only brokerage in the country. The company has a large amount of repeat business among landlords in New York City. Generally, the company is one of three choices that a landlord will have in the running to represent them on a new project in the city. Today, you can scarcely walk a block in New York City without seeing the familiar RKF banner advertising a space for lease.

And those signs are on some very high profile projects right now. The company is also working on one of the largest retail projects in the city, Greenwich Street also known as Warren Street , which has , square feet of retail space. Minskoff Equities. RKF is also leasing West 14th Street in the Meatpacking District, a project that will contain 50, square feet of retail. The two lead a team of brokers in those markets. Historically, the retail centers of the boroughs were the multiple business districts that were scattered throughout the boroughs, clustered around train or subway and bus stops.

As residential prices continue to rise in Manhattan, there has been a stronger demand for residential space in the boroughs. As the boroughs have become more populated — and more popular with a younger, more sophisticated demographic — new retail corridors have developed.

One undeniable fact about the boroughs that exists is the population density. Brooklyn and Queens both have about 2. If you took that population and placed it anywhere else in the U. There is one regional mall in each borough, so there is plenty of need for retail.

Big box retail continues to evolve in the boroughs. Smaller retail continues to infill. With more residential being developed — in some areas luxury residential — the boroughs are seeing increased density and higher incomes than before. Retailers like Target, IKEA and Whole Foods, who have opened or are slated to open in the boroughs, have shown the way for smaller national and regional tenants who want to expand there. RKF is currently leasing the 35,square-foot retail portion of Kent Street, a luxury loft complex in Brooklyn.

In Queens, the company has leased Metropolitan Avenue, a facility that now houses two levels of big box space totaling 66, square feet. RKF secured leases with Staples and Michaels, among others for the project.

The 1. Developers and national retailers have recognized the spending power of the Bronx resident. Located at Third Avenue and th Street, the , square-foot mixed-use development will feature a car parking garage and street-front retail including a 16,square-foot Rite Aid, a 42,square-foot Forman Mills and an 18,square-foot Staples Office Supplies Superstore.

The company is also representing smaller specialty retailers looking for specific locations in the boroughs. With New York City as its headquarters, the company has used its landlord and tenant relationships to parlay business in new markets and new areas of the retail business. For instance, after having success with one landlord in New York, RKF was asked to lease a project for the company in another state. On the tenant rep side, tenants have led the company to open offices in Los Angeles and Las Vegas.

With new lifestyle centers and mixed-use projects in the U. The company currently has more than 2. The firm becomes involved in projects where it will be necessary to have upscale lifestyle retail and restaurants as an attractive feature for the development. RKF Retail Property Advisors works closely with both the developers and the master architects of the projects to create a leasing program and merchandising plans for the centers, then carries those plans out.

The company is handling leasing for the ,square-foot retail portion of The Mercato in Naples, Florida, for The Lutgert Companies. It is also the exclusive consultant for the retail leasing of Bloomfield Park, a mixed-use development that Developers Diversified is building in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, which will have , square feet of retail.

In Chicago, the company is leasing the ,square-foot retail portion of The New City, a new mixed-use project Structured Development is creating in Lincoln Park. It is leasing the ,square-foot lifestyle component at Westwood Station, a 1. We know the intricacies of these projects; understanding that the success of the retail translates directly to every other venue within the development is paramount. The company has opened offices in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, and plans to open offices in other cities as well.

Since RKF does so many deals on behalf of landlords and tenants in New York City, it has the opportunity to meet with many tenants from either side of the table and establish a reputation with both parties. They want long-term relationships. It has also placed tenants in the areas malls, centers and great shopping streets. In its Las Vegas office, which employs 10 people, the company has picked up a number of leasing assignments in that city for hotel and condo landlords with retail space.

In markets where RKF does not have a presence, the company forms strategic alliances with other brokers to locate tenants. This relationship goes both ways, since some of the reciprocal firms clients will eventually look for space in a market where RKF is active.

Because RKF was so prominent in the retail leasing side, it was a natural for the company to begin handling investment sales and acquisitions for clients as well. While their sales may be located in New York, the properties they locate for exchange clients are located across the U. Since retail is usually only a portion of a building in New York City, the company finds itself selling multifamily deals with retail spaces and small office buildings with retail. Most of the sellers that the company works with are families, individuals and institutions who own real estate in New York.

In the boroughs, sellers tend to be more individuals and family controlled entities. A recent deal for RKF followed the entire lifecycle of a space. RKF investment advisors represented the purchaser of a retail condominium at Lexington Avenue in Manhattan.

Real estate in the city is in demand, and buyers are not afraid to pay the price to attain the assets they want. Especially popular are retail condominiums. The demand for exchanges by its seller clients has led the company to create a national network to locate properties for its clients.

This enables RKF to quickly locate a property for a seller to transition their capital to within the day window provided by the tax code. The division is growing in those markets as well. To help retailers and owners looking to fill a void, RKF launched a consulting services practice, headed by Stacey Leibowitz.

On the landlord side, the division helps land owners realize what a property can be used for by doing feasibility studies on a particular piece of property. The same can be said for underutilized buildings that a landlord may own. This can lead to the type of center that the developer ends up creating. On the retail side, RKF works with retailers who are entering new markets and want to be strategic about the locations it chooses in a given market.

It works with them to determine the correct cities, then the correct market within those cities. It then passes the retailer on to the brokerage side of the business to represent them in the market in finding space. The division has also worked with manufacturers looking to open one flagship store. We discuss the best solution to certain situations, but sometimes I have to make a gut decision and go with it. A brokerage business is not easy to run.

That entrepreneurial edge has given the brokers and advisors at RKF a reason to stay. Fiercely independent and competitive — in the toughest brokerage market in the U. But at RKF, brokers are loyal because they are rewarded and treated well.

They stay busy. For many years, Futterman worked for another brokerage firm, as have most of his brokers, and recognized what was the right way of doing things and what was the wrong way, especially when it came to how to treat employees. Futterman believes being independent and retail focused allows the company to better service its clients. The brokers are held accountable for account service, developing a strategy for a property or retailer, accurate reporting of activity on a property or site search.

The company supports brokers with intense market research on the tenant side, and advertising and marketing for properties it is leasing. The company has a five-person market research and mapping department who studies location, demographics, sales volumes and traffic patterns of each property.

For retailers, the research department can analyze potential locations for similar data. The plan is to turn the Plaza into the ultimate shopping-cum-entertainment experience for the well-heeled, a high-end Disney-esque world, where the Palm Court is a refined Crystal Palace, the Oak Room is a Liberty Tree Tavern with white-gloved waiters serving aged sirloins, and luxury retailers hawk fashion, jewelry, accessories, cosmetics, antiques and gourmet victuals in , square feet of space spread over six levels.

Elad president Miki Naftali said several letters of intent have been signed, but declined to name tenants until the leases are completed. Retail and restaurant tenants are expected to begin opening in the third quarter of , and a grand opening is scheduled for October The retail configuration lends itself to several scenarios.

Futterman, chairman of the firm that bears his name, and exclusive retail leasing agent for the project. Andrew Hinkley, vice president of retail development for Elad, estimated that about 25 percent of the 64 retail spaces would be leased to luxury firms with stores in the vicinity. Retail space at the Plaza does not come cheap. The rates are comparable to those in the area. Leasing retail space at the Plaza is not without challenges.

Together with the union and the mayor, we created a win-win situation. We went through a long process with Landmarks. This is the only hotel in North America with some interior spaces landmarked. Elad supported landmark designation. Futterman contended luxury firms would be drawn to the Plaza for the very reason parts of it are landmarked — the historical, not to mention nostalgic, significance.

The room will have 3, square feet on the ground floor and another 1, square feet on a mezzanine. This would be a new concept for all of them. In the Palm Court, which will remain a restaurant, Elad is re-creating a 1,square-foot glass dome using black-and-white photos of the original and shards of colored glass found in the demolition. According to Naftali, a former owner, Conrad Hilton, took down the interior skylight or laylight in the mid-Forties and installed a dropped ceiling.

From the Palm Court there will be a clear vista to the Terrace Room, with gilted archways, baroque chandeliers and leather ceiling that recall the design excesses of the days when Ivana Trump ran the hotel. One level below the atrium will be the Grand Concourse. About 10, square feet will become a food hall. The 6,square-foot Lower Concourse will be devoted to a fitness center with a swimming pool; the mezzanine will house a hair salon, antiques shop and antique book seller.

The Grand Ballroom on the first floor will be pressed into service once again for boldface nuptials. Meeting rooms will be on the second floor along with a 7,square-foot spa operated by a company based in a French chateau. There will also be hotel condominium residences. Across the street from the Plaza, a retail phenomenon is unfolding in the form of the Apple Computer store, which is drawing heavy traffic.

Robert Futterman talks New York retail, from the mom-and-pop shops to Wal-Mart in the city to the upper-end merchants going into the revamped Plaza Hotel. And that statement is increasingly more expensive. Still, Futterman, whose firm handled the retail in the Time Warner Center and is now marketing the retail in the Plaza Hotel, said in a recent podcast that he sees a continued diversity in New York City retail.

Futterman talked of the retail potential for the South Bronx, for the Meatpacking District, and for the Plaza, pulling the curtain back for the first time publicly on which retailers might end up in the iconic hotel-turned-partly-condo. And I hope they will end up in New York City sometime in the future.

RF: I think it could be in the next five years. I think the outer-boroughs makes sense. Manhattan is probably too expensive. You can filter them based on skills, years of employment, job, education, department, and prior employment. Washington Mutual Salaries. You can even request information on how much does Washington Mutual pay if you want to.

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SKAGIAS INVESTMENTS WITH HIGH RETURNS

Uwe Jirjahn, Kenneth W. Izan, Joseph G. Haubrich, Stulz ed. Kuhnen, Camelia M. Rebel A. Michael T. Fried, Jason G. Brian J. Liebman, Sah, R. Fich, Eliezer M. John M. Hannon, Konstantinos Pouliakas, Jonah E. Taylor, Nancy L. Daniel Parent, Braz Camargo, Alexander K. Geiler, P. Calcagno, R. Johansson, Anders C. David T. Sensoy, Samwick, Krishna B.

Miller, Wang, C. Wang, Cheng, Gibbons, R. Felipe Balmaceda, Renneboog, L. Frey, Kulich, C. Lanning, Census Bureau, revised May Steven A. Matthews, Michael R. Veall, Sloan, Frank A. Bruce A. Seaton, Dietl, Helmut M. Helmut M. Priscila Ferreira, Murphy, Victor Lavy, Cooley, Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. Weisbach, Jacek Rothert, Pierre Chaigneau, Bernd Theilen, Vishny, Banks Compensate their Top Management Teams?

Sin-Yu Ho, KG, vol. Garvey, Gerald T. Dana C. Basov Suren, Journal of Theoretical Economics , De Gruyter, vol. Illoong Kwon, Marco, Marini, Barro, Jason R. Evidence from postwar tax reforms ," Journal of Public Economics , Elsevier, vol.

Molloy, Rampini, Lucian A. Anthony M. Choe, Chongwoo, Paul L. Schmidt, Ross Levine, Bertrand, M. Martin Hellwig, Kenneth L. Judd, Rayton, Bruce A. William N. Ambrose, Beck, T. Rebers, E. Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, Cziraki, P. Szilagyi, Stulz, Politecnica Marche - Dept.

And despite these efforts, the US economy contracted by 3. These sums of course do not count costs incurred elsewhere around the world: government commitments to support the financial sector peaked at an astonishing 70 percent of GDP in the UK Bank of England , p. While these figures obviously can be no more than a rough approximation of social cost, the gulf between social and private losses is clear.

It not only increases prices but induces greater inaccuracy in the rationing of credit. This has the propensity to make both lenders and would-be borrowers worse off. It is tolerably clear that the difficulties banks found themselves in by the fall of were the consequence of the pursuit of high-risk, high-return strategies by bank executives.

Why did the mechanisms ordinarily deployed to control externalities fail to do so for financial firms? The consensus view is that the appropriate techniques for controlling externalities are themselves external to firms: that is, they do not involve any modification to internal corporate governance commitments. We will consider here three such mechanisms: contracts, liability rules, and regulation. Given the desirable properties of SVM in controlling agency costs for shareholders, this seems a powerful argument against interference with core corporate governance commitments.

More troublingly still, SVM in some cases actually tends to undermine the efficacy of these mechanisms. This forces the bank to take into account expected costs to creditors. However, retail depositors typically do a poor job in pricing risk ex ante.

In the event of bank failure, the agency pays out to the depositors and is subrogated to their claims against the bank. Moreover, and crucially, costs of bank failure also fall heavily on parties who do not—and cannot—contract with the bank. Anyone who relies on the payments system, or who might in the future wish to obtain credit, can suffer losses from bank failure. The failure of a systemically important bank, as noted previously, may affect other banks far beyond the extent of counterparty relationships.

However, this exacerbates the problem of creditor moral hazard. The effect of bailouts is to provide ex post insurance to nondepositor creditors of banks. Such creditors anticipate the provision of insurance, even if no explicit guarantees are made, in turn reducing the borrowing costs systemically important banks have to pay to engage in risk-taking. Roe Consequently, even those creditors who would be able to cause banks to internalize part of the social costs of their risk-taking will fail to do so.

The expectation of insurance undermines even the partial internalization that would otherwise occur via contract. Tort liability is thought to function in a complementary way to contractual allocation of costs. The dominant analytic move in private law is to view tort as filling gaps where contractual resolution is not feasible ex ante Calabresi Given the considerable difficulties with contractual internalization, we might imagine a role for tort liability as an alternative way of internalizing losses associated with bank failure.

It turns out, however, that tort law does no useful work in internalizing systemic harms. This rule imposes a bar on recovery for losses caused otherwise than as a direct result of physical harm to persons or property. For example, a beachfront hotel might find ingress of oil into its swimming pool, necessitating a period of closure to permit cleanup.

The lost profits for this period of closure might be recoverable as well as the direct costs of the cleanup. However, those whose property is not physically harmed are ordinarily unable to recover lost profits. For example, a hotel operating several streets back from the beachfront, which experiences no direct contamination, nevertheless suffers a sharp fall in profits because holidaymakers avoid the area en masse having seen the oil spill on television.

There is no physical harm, only economic. Whether it is desirable for the economic loss rule to restrict recoveries for systemic harms seems doubtful. An underlying problem is that systemic financial harms are typically triggered by the bankruptcy of a financial firm. But shareholder personal liability can be triggered only if the firm actually goes bankrupt. And precisely because systemic firm bankruptcy is a trigger for contagion, political actors have powerful incentives to intervene with preemptive bailouts.

Even if one firm is permitted to go bankrupt, political and regulatory actors will strenuously intervene to avoid the failure of other firms. Consequently, even if liability could be imposed on shareholders in bankruptcy as a theoretical matter, deterrence would be undermined by the expectation of government intervention. The third well-known response to the problem of social costs posits that regulators should impose a penalty or tax on an activity that generates negative externalities, such that the full social cost of its activities are imposed upon the firm Pigou , pp.

In the presence of appropriately-priced Pigouvian taxes, then the firm has incentives either to reduce the level of the activity in question, or to take precautions against harm up to the extent to which they are socially cost-justified. Under such circumstances, SVM operates virtuously. One approach is to innovate new ways of performing the activity in question that yield lower social costs.

This both reduces social costs and increases shareholder profits, so is clearly desirable. Proponents of regulation commonly assume such innovation to be a desirable side-effect of the imposition of Pigouvian taxes. However, there are other ways to enhance shareholder value, which are not socially desirable. A firm pursuing SVM now has a choice: either innovate new processes as conventional theory implies or reorient its activities so that they fall more squarely within the gaps.

The financial crisis provides many examples of regulatory slack. Whether arbitrage will be pursued will depend on its costs to the firm, relative to innovation. In this context, SVM mechanisms actually give managers of widely held firms worse incentives than those of sole owners under equivalent circumstances. This is because SVM is implemented in a way that seeks to encourage managerial risk-taking.

Pushing against regulatory boundaries is risky. A sole owner, whose investment in the firm was not diversified, would be less willing to take such risks than managers incentivized per SVM. We might therefore seize on a policy response of minimizing regulatory slack: channeling resources toward regulation so as to eliminate gaps and increase enforcement intensity.

But this would overlook the corrosive impact of SVM on the regulatory design process itself. Firms focused on minimizing their regulatory costs can do so not only by exploiting slack within the current regulatory set-up, but by influencing the production and enforcement of regulation so as to increase the effective amount of slack.

Moreover, as systemically important firms tend to be large, the resources available to those running the firm to try to influence regulators are considerable. The constitutional framework partially determines the extent to which firms are able to exert influence of this sort—encompassing political donations, 16 lobbying campaigns, sponsorship of directed research, revolving door employment opportunities for regulators and aggressive legal challenges to regulatory decisions, to name but a few.

Thus the firm has an additional choice when it comes to cost-minimization: influence. While it may be impossible to say a priori which of these strategies will be cost-minimizing for the firm, there are strong reasons for thinking that influence is often likely to dominate. If the firm invests in innovation, it will then be exposed to the risk of renegotiation or recalculation by the regulator, whereby an ex post increase in the level of regulatory tax will reduce the net returns to shareholders.

If the firm cannot be certain ex ante that such renegotiation will not occur, then it will be hard to price the expected returns to investment in innovation. Investments in influencing the regulator will be much easier to price, however, because to the extent to which they are successful, they will give the firm certainty over the likely regulatory costs ex post. In other words, it is likely that a firm committed to minimizing its regulatory costs will always want to pursue a strategy of influencing the regulator.

The closer the focus on cost-minimization, which SVM encourages, the more severe we may expect this corrosion of regulatory pricing of social cost to become. To summarize: private law mechanisms for controlling externalities fare poorly where systemic risk is concerned, because of the propensity of governments to bail out troubled firms. Regulatory constraints therefore have to carry extra heavy freight; yet they are systematically corroded by SVM.

This poses the question whether SVM is an appropriate framework for the governance of systemically important financial firms. The case for implementation of SVM in corporate governance rests on its utility in rendering managers accountable to shareholders. For most firms, this case is very strong. Left to their own devices, managers would likely prefer to run firms in accordance with their own interests, rather than those of shareholders. To the extent that these mechanisms do not function perfectly, the standard view of corporate governance sees the relationship between externalities and shareholder value as a trade-off.

Tying managerial returns to stock price performance as a means of controlling managerial agency costs is thought to generate greater value for shareholders than the collateral increase in externalities. For systemic harms, given the size of social losses and the weakness of ordinary control mechanisms, it seems optimistic to assume this condition is met.

Nevertheless, an advocate of SVM might assert that this is an empirical question; without further evidence no case is made out for relaxing SVM. Rather, SVM tends to harm the interests of both diversified shareholders and society. As a result, there is a powerful case for the modification of internal corporate governance arrangements where systemic externalities are present.

A central tenet of modern portfolio theory is that diversification reduces portfolio risk. By spreading capital across many uncorrelated investments comprising a portfolio, idiosyncratic risks associated with individual investments can be eliminated at the portfolio level.

Investors consequently need only to be compensated for bearing market risk. One of the most important ideas in modern corporate governance—that it is desirable to encourage managerial risk-taking—is based on this premise. Diversified shareholders may be expected to behave, as regards decisions over idiosyncratic risks, as though they are risk-neutral.

Individual managers running firms, however, are likely to have significant amounts of undiversified human capital tied up in the firm. Thus managers may be expected to exhibit greater risk aversion than diversified shareholders would prefer. This creates a problem: managers may shun higher net present value NPV projects because their returns are more volatile. Modern thinking on corporate governance focuses on particular mechanisms to address the mismatch of risk preferences between diversified shareholders and managers, with the goal of giving managers incentives not to pass up positive NPV projects because of risk aversion.

The way in which this is implemented has two aspects. They consequently encourage managers to focus more on good outcomes, and less on bad, thereby reducing risk aversion Jensen and Murphy The rationale for the business judgment rule is frequently stated as being to mitigate the problem of managerial risk-aversion we have just described, framed in terms of the interests of diversified shareholder.

Chancellor Allen explained the rationale as follows in the Delaware case of Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc. Shareholders' investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm's cost of capital ….

But directors will tend to deviate from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss.

Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit. Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.

Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally. The point of the business judgment rule is not to sanction negligence. Rather, the rule is premised on the view that the encouragement of business risk-taking requires acceptance of the inevitability of business failures and that a liability rule premised on negligence will result in hindsight bias determinations of negligence.

Given the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. Obviously, it is in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence, etc.

In sum, the structure of corporate governance arrangements, at least in the USA, is explicitly directed towards encouraging managers to undertake the highest-NPV projects available to them, regardless of their level of risk. This assumption is invalid, however, if some projects have the potential to contribute to market risk.

In other words, market risk reflects exogenous macroeconomic volatility, which affects firms, but not vice versa. The intuition behind this is that if a project or firm fails, this will only affect that firm, or at worst, a few others sufficiently proximate to the activity in question to suffer loss. Indeed, the failure of one firm may strengthen the market position of rivals.

However, if a bad state realization causes sufficiently widespread losses to other firms, then it is better understood as affecting market risk. Consequently investors will be unable to diversify this away. The financial sector provides an intuitive example.

The closure, even temporarily, of a bank involved in the payments system would lead to widespread social costs being borne by other users of the payments system. Thus activities that increase the risk of bank failure would both lower expected returns and increase volatility for the market as a whole. The consequence of this is to damage the interests of a diversified shareholder in two ways. First, genuinely systemic harm will reduce expected returns across such a wide cross-section of firms as to undermine diversification.

The combined effect will be to reduce stock prices throughout the diversified portfolio and to impose losses on diversified shareholders that far exceed the losses on the failed bank. Critically, the expected single-firm gains associated with ratcheting up the risk-taking by the bank will be swamped by the expected increase in portfolio-wide losses that such risk-taking would entail. The consequences of an exclusive focus on SVM in a systemically important firm can be illustrated with a simple numerical example.

The example illustrates the conflict of interest between a manager or other controller with incentives to maximize the share price and the diversified shareholders. Assume M can cause Bank to pursue a risky strategy. But DS, unlike M, hold shares in other firms. Assume now that if Bank fails, it triggers a systemic shock that causes a general decline in market values of 10 percent.

DS, unlike M, will bear losses associated with that systemic effect. The example makes simplifying assumptions, of course, but without loss of generality: if additional expected returns from risk-taking are high enough, managers or other controllers will find it rational to pursue risk-taking that diversified shareholders would find irrational.

DS are better off holding stock in Bank than not doing so. If DS hold no stock in Bank, they face the downside of potential systemic distress costs but none of the benefit of successful risk taking. Stock prices impound own-firm expected returns from increased risk-taking, but not the potential harms to other firms.

Thus for systemically important firms, encouraging managers to take more risks achieves precisely the opposite result to that which is ordinarily desirable. So long as the firm is taking its highest-NPV projects, diversified shareholders or shareholders who could be diversified should be satisfied, even if the firm is not successful.

For systemically important financial firms, the matter is quite different. This is because the failure of a systemically important firm produces losses across the portfolio. So, where systemic harms are concerned, diversified shareholders may prefer that the bank pursue more conservative projects, while managers with high-powered incentives or undiversified controllers would prefer the bank pursue more risky projects. Startlingly, this result is an outright reversal of the ordinary framework for corporate governance.

Diversified shareholders, instead of wanting managers to take more risk than the latter are wont to do, actually want them to take less risk. This is also consistent with our theory if, as seems plausible, weak managerial insulation disproportionately empowers concentrated shareholders, who face lower coordination costs. Our discussion has focused on the financial sector. Other scholars have argued that SVM gives rise to more widespread problems e. Stout ; Mayer In this section, we ask whether the problem we identify generalizes to nonfinancial firms.

In the presence of effective external mechanisms for internalizing social costs, SVM functions virtuously to promote the interests of society. Where these external mechanisms do not function well, then the social utility of SVM becomes harder to determine a priori. It depends on the relative size of the benefits of controlling within-firm agency costs and the costs of externalities. Yet where the externalities are systemic in character, then this tradeoff disappears: SVM no longer benefits diversified shareholders, and so is a priori problematic.

Consequently regulatory mechanisms are used to deter excessive risk taking and the imposition of probabilistic social harm, the efficacy of which is undermined by SVM. One can easily think of harms matching these criteria that might be caused by nonfinancial firms. Emissions from a nuclear plant or a deep-sea oil well are two plausible examples.

There are, however, important differences between these cases and systemic financial firms. First, tort law does do significant work to internalize social costs where there is some component of direct harm. Second, for nonfinancial systemic harms, the bankruptcy of the firm would not trigger the systemic loss: given the existence of some element of direct harm, the direction of causality is likely to run the other way.

These elements suggest that private law liability has a meaningful role to play in relation to nonfinancial systemic harms. A third difference concerns the role of government. Where the harm in question is systemic, it will be large enough to have political implications. We may expect government to mobilize to remedy the problem. If the harm is caused by the bankruptcy of the firm, as with financial firms, this mobilization will consist of actions designed to avoid bankruptcy from occurring: bail-outs.

But if the harm has been caused by a firm that is not bankrupt, then the mobilization may be expected to include actions that threaten to bankrupt the firm. These two types of government intervention have opposite effects on incentives. In sum, whilst a case can be made that SVM tends to exacerbate externalities in nonfinancial firms, the implications depend on careful scrutiny of relative costs and benefits. In this respect, financial firms really are different. The causal link between bankruptcy and systemic harm, and the perverse incentives created by government bail-outs, mean that an a priori case for relaxing SVM can be made.

In the absence of effective constraints on the internalization of social costs by financial firms, the interests of diversified shareholders and controllers managers and concentrated owners diverge over the appropriate level of risk-taking for activities capable of giving rise to systemic harms.

Encouraging managers to focus on SVM will consequently result in excessive risk-taking not only from the standpoint of third parties, but also as regards the interests of diversified shareholders. Relaxing SVM in such circumstances does not engender the conflict between agency costs and externalities its defenders normally identify. We should make clear that we do not advocate the abandonment of all accountability of managers to shareholders. We say nothing about appointment and voting rights, for example.

Rather, we seek to identify discrete changes to the existing corporate governance framework which are calculated to reduce the intensity with which managers focus on the stock price. In this section, we canvass ways in which this might be done. A relaxation of SVM for systemically important financial firms has already begun to happen through regulatory initiatives in relation to executive pay.

A range of policy proposals have sought to modify executive compensation in financial institutions so as ameliorate incentives e. Ideas of this type have been taken up by regulators around the world: in April , G20 representatives agreed to a set of guidelines detailing how national financial regulators should align performance-related pay with the long term and risk-adjusted performance of financial firms Financial Stability Forum The European Union has gone further in seeking to weaken managerial incentives to increase shareholder value, by imposing a cap on the ratio of variable to fixed executive compensation.

We do not doubt that changes to executive pay have the potential to reduce systemic externalities, and we support the general thrust of these reforms. But we are skeptical whether, by themselves, they are enough. The rules impose the same model on all applicable firms, which is problematic if—as seems likely—firms vary as regards which governance structures are appropriate. A straightforward proposal such as to tie managerial pay to bond performance as well as stock performance, for example, runs into the immediate problem that in ordinary times bond values are much more influenced by market-wide interest rate changes than own-firm credit risk changes, and that an already-fragile alternative measure of single-firm credit risk, credit default swap spreads, will be undercut by use as a regulatory device Lucas While in the short run public outcry may be enough to secure the implementation of some headline rules, we may expect their application to be systematically weakened over time through concerted influence by the regulated firms Culpepper ; Coffee These limitations can readily be illustrated by the implementation of regulatory prescriptions regarding compensation practices.

The G20 Principles, for example, require performance-related pay to vary with ex post realizations of risk outcomes, over a sufficiently long period of time. In relation to senior executives, this takes the form of a requirement that 40—60 percent of variable pay be deferred for a period of at least three years Financial Stability Board , p.

It is unclear what magic lies in these particular numbers. And consistently with our observations about regulatory influence, the rules applying these guidelines in the USA have been held up by industry lobbying and inter-agency wrangling such that no effective changes have yet been implemented.

Some might say the clash of shareholder interests in relation to systemic harms points to a straightforward governance solution: since diversified shareholders typically constitute the majoritarian owners of the firms in question, should shareholder democracy not produce checks on excessive risk-taking by managers?

Although superficially promising, a strategy of governance reform through shareholder self-help at the firm level is unlikely to be sufficient to check excessive risk-taking by systemic firms. This refers to self-interested behavior by intermediaries who are typically evaluated by relative, rather than absolute, performance. Such intermediaries ordinarily have little incentive to intervene in the governance of portfolio firms, because to do so would incur private costs yet confer a benefit on their investment management competitors who also hold the same stock—a classic free-rider problem.

While intermediaries cannot avoid the systemic risk associated with a financial firm simply by selling the shares in question unlike in the case of an under-performing nonfinancial firm , relative performance evaluation still creates a collective action problem. Indeed, as we argue above, intermediaries will face incentives to bid up the shares of risk-taking financial firms.

Second, the structure of governance activism almost invariably produces pressure for improved stock price performance at the governance target. But blockholders, who reduce diversification in the assembly of their block, generally focus attention on maximizing the share price of the particular firm, prodding management in that direction Brav et al. This is how the blockholder earns returns from its activism and achieves compensation for bearing undiversified risk. Ordinarily, in the case of nonfinancial firms, blockholder interests are aligned with the diversified shareholders.

In the case of systemic financial firms, however, the antagonism of interests means that what is ordinarily virtuous may become a vice for diversified shareholders. That said, there may be grounds for institutional investors to influence governance in systemic firms through political, rather than firm-level, channels Black ; Armour Such associations may be capable of forming a useful counterweight to financial sector lobbying, although evidence of collective asset manager lobbying in favor of more stringent systemic risk controls in the post-financial crisis period has so far been scant.

In light of our hesitancy regarding the success of either or both of the foregoing mechanisms—compensation constraints and revived shareholder democracy—it is desirable to consider others. A third possibility would be personal liability for those who control and monitor the strategy of systemically important firms.

Liability of this sort could complement other measures by adding three distinct and beneficial features. First, and unlike rules about executive pay, liability rules would create a role for court-developed standards in the governance of such firms. Liability standards avoid the problems described in Section 3. Because compliance with standards is fleshed out ex post by courts, problems of arbitrage can be mitigated. Second, judicially crafted standards are less open to subversion by industry influence than regulatory prescriptions.

Judges can only propound new precedents in light of cases brought before them; combined with standing rules this provides some sort of check on the extent to which a judicial standard can be subverted by lobbying. This is not to say that litigation is immune from industry influence; rather, that it is relatively robust.

Third, because enforcement is in the hands of private plaintiffs, rather than regulators, opportunities for lobbying to undermine its efficacy are much reduced. Private plaintiffs in shareholder litigation are widely dispersed, and so more difficult for lobbyists to reach than centralized regulators. To be sure, judges—even those who specialize in corporate law—probably lack expertise when it comes to systemic risk, as compared with regulators.

Hence we do not propose replacing regulatory controls with judicial ones. Rather, we suggest liability rules as an additional mechanism to relax SVM in systemic firms. To the extent that regulatory interventions to control systemic risk are successful, there should be little cause for ex post liability.

Judicial control may be less precise than regulators, but it is more robust to lobbying. Our claim is that judicially crafted liability rules could usefully complement the regulatory changes already being implemented. Director liability is not an innovation in the control of risk-taking by financial institutions; rather, it has a long history in helping to overcome the characteristic fragility of banks and the contagion risks from single bank failure.

In the well-known decision of Litwin v. Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment or for mistakes while acting with reasonable skill and prudence …. Undoubtedly, a director of a bank is held to stricter accountability than the director of an ordinary business corporation.

A director of a bank is entrusted with the funds of depositors, and the stockholders look to him for protection from the imposition of personal liability. What would be slight neglect in the care exercised in the affairs of a turnpike corporation, or even of a manufacturing corporation, might be gross neglect in care exercised in the management of a savings bank entrusted with the savings of a multitude of poor people, depending for its life upon credit and liable to be wrecked by a breath of suspicion.

The stability-enhancing mechanism of common law bank-director liability faded in importance after the adoption of the Federal Deposit Insurance of A state law retreat on negligence liability followed, sometimes through explicitly targeted protection for bank officers and directors; 39 in other cases as part of an omnibus retreat on director liability for breaches of the duty of care.

Van Gorkom. In the midth century deposit insurance offered sufficient stability because of the diffuse structure of the banking system and the deposit-like nature of most banking liabilities. Today, much greater concentration in banking and a shift in the nature of financial-institution liabilities means that the failure of a large financial firm may harm not only the shareholders and creditors of the particular firm but also other firms and the financial system more generally.

Our proposal, in brief, is as follows. Second, an oversight framework in which the board has oversight responsibility for the level of risk-taking by the firm, including risk-taking in operations as well as strategy, not just its compliance with applicable legal norms. Third, a standard of liability that is negligence-based, because the risk-neutral heuristic associated with the business judgment rule is inappropriate where systemic risks are concerned.

We refer in the discussion to aspects of Delaware law in order to illustrate how judge-made law could accommodate this type of mechanism, but the framework could also be implemented by Federal courts, as we explain in section 7. The challenge is to operationalize the concept. Board-level accountability is an important element in establishing and adhering to appropriate risk parameters. We focus attention on those controlling a corporation, because of the divergence between the interests of controllers and diversified shareholders in the case of systemic externalities.

It is helpful to reflect on the classes of person involved in corporate governance. Officers are executives, tasked with making decisions about the running of the company. They consequently have the power to initiate corporate decision-making.

They also typically face high-powered incentives derived from variable compensation determined by reference to the share price. Directors , in contrast, are tasked with acting as monitors of the performance of the officers. Their engagement generally takes the form of veto rights, through board decision-making on proposals initiated by executives; monitoring of performance reporting, and oversight of compensation and retention-decisions for senior managers.

Their incentives are comparatively low-powered, driven by personal integrity and reputational concerns Kraakman et al , p. Directors may also be officers, although in recent years the roles have become increasingly specialized, with the typical corporate board containing only one officer, the CEO Gordon , p.

The position of controlling shareholders also deserves attention. While such persons do not enjoy formal day-to-day control rights, they do control the identity of the board, and through them, the executives. They will be motivated by high-powered incentives stemming from their share ownership stake.

These categories of person between them face two different types of governance problem, which in turn track two different types of liability standard. On the one hand, officers with equity pay and controlling shareholders may face a conflict of interest as regards systemic externalities. Their personal financial interest lies in maximizing the stock price.

Consequently risk appetite in systemic firms can be seen as a duty of loyalty problem, akin to other conflicts of interest between controllers and diversified shareholders. On the other hand, directors do not face direct financial conflicts. Rather, they face more genteel pressures of camaraderie and community between themselves and officers, which may have a subtly corrosive effect on their ability to monitor and exert oversight.

Even absent these handicaps, directors lack strong incentives to take adequate care in the oversight of the decisions of executives. In corporations, conflicts of interest are acceptable on the part of those running the company provided that appropriate procedural and substantive safeguards are met. The key procedural safeguards are 2-fold: first, full disclosure about the conflicted transaction by the insiders and second, approval by the independent directors or an independent board committee, tasked with determining whether the proposed transaction serves the interests of the unaffiliated shareholders.

The greater the conflict, the more onerous the job of the independents, and the more carefully the court will examine the process and the outcome. For activities that could engender systemic externalities, controllers may prefer more of the activity to be undertaken, or with less precaution, than diversified shareholders.

Consequently decisions relating to such activities may deserve to be treated like other conflicts of interest. This should entail both full disclosure by the managers of the risks and genuine review by an independent risk committee of the board. For management, this would encompass equity-based pay; for controlling shareholders, it would comprise dividends or capital gains, in each case to the extent their value was enhanced by the risk-taking strategy. The regime thereby creates a powerful incentive for managers and controlling shareholders to take risk management seriously.

It also gives a deterrent incentive that is precisely correlated with the size of the conflict of interest. Turning now to directors: they will not themselves be responsible for the operational decisions that trigger excessive levels of risk. Here liability is imposed not for having made inappropriate decisions regarding risk-taking, but rather for having delegated these decisions to others and failed to oversee their decision-making.

However, the duty articulated in Caremark has been taken to apply only in a very limited way. Framing monitoring obligations as parasitic upon corporate regulatory obligations is in keeping with the standard account of how corporate externalities are controlled.

This framing assumes regulatory obligations are set appropriately to internalize social costs; and second, that the business judgment rule rests on a sound policy basis. Neither is valid where systemic risks are concerned.

Consequently, it is desirable for a duty to monitor to be applied in wider circumstances and to a higher standard. This tells boards that compliance with regulation is not necessarily enough to ensure freedom from potential liability. Such a stance is desirable if there may be regulatory slack. It reserves to the courts power to assess ex post whether or not risk-oversight systems were adequate, regardless of the level of regulatory compliance.

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