First, though, a caveat: it is impossible for a list like this to be entirely comprehensive. FirstCoin has a current supply of ,, with 31,, Nakamoto is estimated to have mined about 1 million Bitcoin during , none of which have ever been used since Bitcoin: Bitcoin was the first and is the most commonly traded cryptocurrency to date.
There has been an hourly dip by Crypto news everyday. Established in First Coin Company is an official distributor of more than 25 mints from around the world and specializes in supplying a wide range of authentic modern world collectible legal tender silver and gold numismatic coins with unique designs and high collectible demand in retail and wholesale.
Login or Registration First, though, a caveat: it is impossible for a list like this to be entirely comprehensive. First Mover flagged the possibility. According to a report in Bitcoin Magazine, one of the earliest attempts at creating a cryptocurrency actually predates bitcoin's creation by about 20 years. Users are able to generate FRST through the process of mining. Loki cryptocurrency is a privacy coin built on the Monero codebase.
Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. First coin cryptocurrencywww. No Comments. Post A Comment Cancel Reply. She generates a random number r and sends. Alice then divides this result by r. The Schnorr Algorithms. The Schnorr family of algorithms includes an identification procedure and a signature with appendix. These algorithms are based on a zero-knowledge proof of possession of a secret key. Let p and q be large prime numbers with q dividing p — 1.
Let g be a generator; that is, an integer between 1 and p such that. If s is an integer mod q , then the modular exponentiation operation on s is. If p and q are properly chosen, then modular exponentiation is a one-way function. That is, it is computationally infeasible to find a discrete logarithm. Thus anyone can check whether a given point is on the line, but points on the line can only be generated by someone who knows the secret information.
The basic Schnorr protocol is a zero-knowledge proof that one possesses a given secret quantity m. Let n be the corresponding public quantity. The slope of the line is taken to be secret quantity m , and the prover chooses the intercept at random, differently for each execution of the protocol. The protocol then proceeds as follows. Bob now knows that he is speaking with someone who can generate points on the line.
Thus this party must know the slope of the line, which is the secret quantity m. An important feature of this protocol is that it can be performed only once per line. That is why a new intercept must be generated each time. We call this the two-points-on-a-line principle.
This feature will be useful for electronic cash protocols, since we want to define a spending procedure which reveals nothing of a secret key if used once per coin, but reveals the key if a coin is spent twice. Schnorr identification. The above protocol can be used for identification of users in a network.
Each user is issued a key pair, and each public key is advertised as belonging to a given user. To identify herself, a user needs only prove that she knows her secret key. This can be done using the above zero-knowledge proof, since her public key is linked with her identity.
Schnorr Signature. It is easy to convert the Schnorr identification protocol to produce a digital signature scheme. Rather than receiving a challenge from an on-line verifier, the signer simply takes x to be a secure hash of the message and of the shadow of the line. This proves knowledge of his secret key in a way that links his key pair to the message.
Blind Schnorr Signature. Suppose that Alice wants to obtain a blind Schnorr signature for her coin, which she will spend with Bob. Alice generates random quantities mod q which describe a change of variables. Chaum-Pederson Signature. It involves a single line and point but uses two shadows. This signature scheme can be blinded in a way similar to the ordinary Schnorr signature. Implementations of the Schnorr Protocols.
We have described the Schnorr algorithms in terms of integers modulo a prime p. The protocols, however, work in any setting in which the analogue of the discrete logarithm problem is difficult. An important example is that of elliptic curves see .
Elliptic curve based protocols are much faster, and require the transmission of far less data, than non-elliptic protocols giving the same level of security. We can now present summaries of the main off-line cash schemes from the academic literature. This was the first electronic cash scheme, and is the simplest conceptually. The prevention of multiple spending is accomplished by the cut-and-choose method. For this reason, this scheme is relatively inefficient. This commits Alice to using that particular line in the spending step.
If she re-spends the coin, she must use the same line twice, enabling the Bank to identify her. The Brands scheme is considered by many to be the best of the three, for two reasons. First, it avoids the awkward cut-and-choose technique. Second, it is based only on the Schnorr protocols, and so it can be implemented in various settings such as elliptic curves. The signature it uses is not the blind RSA signature as described above, but a variant called a randomized blind RSA signature.
The ordinary blind RSA scheme has the drawback that the Bank has absolutely no idea what it is signing. As mentioned above, this is not a problem in the cut-and-choose case, but in this case it can allow a payer to defeat the mechanism for identifying multiple spenders. The randomized version avoids this problem by having both Alice and the Bank contribute random data to the message. During payment, Alice reveals a point on this line; if she does so twice, the Bank can identify her.
Moreover, it cannot be implemented over elliptic curves since it is RSA-based. Much of the recent literature on off-line cash has focused on adding features to make it more convenient to use. In this chapter we will discuss two of these features.
Transferability is a feature of paper cash that allows a user to spend a coin that he has just received in a payment without having to contact the Bank in between. We refer to a payment as a transfer if the payee can use the received coin in a subsequent payment. A payment system is transferable if it allows at least one transfer per coin. Figure 2 shows a maximum length path of a coin in a system which allows two transfers.
The final payment is not considered a transfer because it must be deposited by the payee. Transferability would be a convenient feature for an off-line cash system because it requires less interaction with the Bank. A transferable electronic cash system is off-line by definition, since on-line systems require communication with the Bank during each payment. Transferable systems have received little attention in academic literature.
The schemes presented in 3. This is because the coin must contain information about every person who has spent it so that the Bank maintains the ability to identify multiple spenders. See . This growth makes it impossible to allow an unlimited number of transfers. The maximum number of transfers allowed in any given system will be limited by the allowable size of the coin.
There are other concerns with any transferable electronic cash system, even if the number of transfers per coin is limited, and we remove the anonymity property. Until the coin is deposited, the only information available to the Bank is the identity of the individual who originally withdrew the coin. Any other transactions involving that withdrawal can only be reconstructed with the cooperation of each consecutive spender of that coin. This poses the same problems that paper cash poses for detecting money laundering and tax evasion: no records of the transactions are available.
In addition, each transfer delays detection of re-spent or forged coins. Multiple spending will not be noticed until two copies of the same coin are eventually deposited. By then it may be too late to catch the culprit, and many users may have accepted counterfeit coins.
Therefore, detection of multiple spending after the fact may not provide a satisfactory solution for a transferable electronic cash system. A transferable system may need to rely on physical security to prevent multiple spending. See 5. However, unless Alice has stored a large reserve of coins of each possible denomination, it is unlikely that she will have the exact change for most purchases. Another option is for Alice to withdraw a coin of the exact amount for each payment, but that requires interaction with the Bank, making the payment on-line from her point of view.
This allows exact off-line payments to be made without the need to store a supply of coins of different denominations. Paper cash is obviously not divisible, but lack of divisibility is not as much of an inconvenience with paper cash because it is transferable. Coins that are received in one payment can be used again in the next payment, so the supply of different denominations is partially replenished with each transaction. Imagine how quickly a cashier would run out of change if paper cash were not transferable and each payment was put in a separate bin set aside for the next bank deposit!
Three divisible off-line cash schemes have been proposed, but at a cost of a longer transaction time and additional storage. Okamoto and Ohta  is the most efficient of the three, but also the most complicated. It relies on the difficulty of factoring and on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
Figure 3. Node 1I cannot be used in a subsequent payment because it is an ancestor of nodes 2 and 6. Nodes 4 and 5 cannot be used because they are descendants of node 2. Node 3 cannot be used because it is an ancestor of node 6. Nodes 2 and 6 cannot be used more than once, so node 7 is the only node which can be spent in a subsequent payment.
See Figure 3. The leaves of the tree are the nodes at level l , and have the minimum unit of value. Subsequent payments are made according to the following rules:. These two rules insure that no more than one node is used on any path from the root to a leaf. If these two rules are observed, then it will be impossible to spend more than the original value of the coin. If either of these rules are broken, then two nodes on the same path are used, and the information in the two corresponding payments can be combined to reveal the identity of the individual that over-spent in the same way that the identity of a multiple spender is revealed.
Each node i is assigned a secret value, t i. Hence, each node i corresponds to a line. Then the payee sends a challenge x i and the payer responds with. If the same node is spent twice, then responses to two independent challenges, x 1 and x 2 , will reveal two points on the same line: x 1 , y 1 and x 2 , y 2. Then the secret value s can be recovered using the two-points-on-a-line principle described in 3.
If someone tries to overspend a coin, then two nodes in the same path will be used. Suppose that nodes n and m are in the same path, and node n is farther from the root on this path. Spending node n will reveal t m , since node m is an ancestor of node n. But t m was revealed when t n was spent, so sx 1 and hence s will be revealed.
Therefore, spending two nodes in the same path will reveal the identity of the over-spender. These are three examples of off-line cash schemes that have divisible coins. Although providing divisibility complicates the protocol, it can be accomplished without forfeiting untraceability or the ability to detect improper spenders.
The most efficient divisible scheme has a transaction time and required memory per coin proportional to the logarithm of N , where N is the total coin value divided by the value of the minimum divisible unit. More improvements in the efficiency of divisible schemes are expected, since the most recent improvement was just presented in An ancestor of node n is a node on the path from node n to the root node.
In this section we discuss some issues concerning the security of electronic cash. First, we discuss ways to help prevent multiple spending in off-line systems, and we describe the concept of wallet observers. We also discuss the consequences of an unexpected failure in the system?
Finally, we describe a solution to some of the law enforcement problems that are created by anonymity. Instead, off-line multiple spending is detected when the coin is deposited and compared to a database of spent coins. Even in anonymous, untraceable payment schemes, the identity of the multiple-spender can be revealed when the abuse is detected. Detection after the fact may be enough to discourage multiple spending in most cases, but it will not solve the problem.
If someone were able to obtain an account under a false identity, or were willing to disappear after re-spending a large sum of money, they could successfully cheat the system. One way to minimize the problem of multiple spending in an off-line system is to set an upper limit on the value of each payment. This would limit the financial losses to a given merchant due to accepting coins that have been previously deposited. However, this will not prevent someone from spending the same small coin many times in different places.
In order to prevent multiple spending in off-line payments, we need to rely on physical security. This could be in the form of a smart card, a PC card 10 , or any storage device containing a tamper-resistant computer chip. This will prevent abuse in most cases, since the typical criminal will not have the resources to modify the card. Even with a tamper-resistant card, it is still essential to provide cryptographic security to prevent counterfeiting and to detect and identify multiple spenders in case the tamper-protection is somehow defeated.
Also, setting limits on the value of off-line payments would reduce the cost-effectiveness of tampering with the card. Tamper-resistant cards can also provide personal security and privacy to the cardholder by making it difficult for adversaries to read or modify the information stored on the card such as secret keys, algorithms, or records.
All of the basic off-line cash schemes presented in 3. One drawback of this approach is that the user must put a great deal of trust in this device, since the user loses the ability to monitor information entering or leaving the card. Chaum and Pedersen  proposed the idea of embedding a tamper-resistant device into a user-controlled outer module in order to achieve the security benefits of a tamper-resistant device without requiring the user to trust the device.
They call this combination an electronic wallet see Figure 4. However, the outer module cannot complete a transaction without the cooperation of the observer. This gives the observer the power to prevent the user from making transactions that it does not approve of, such as spending the same coin more than once. Brands and Ferguson have both shown how to incorporate observers into their respective electronic cash schemes to prevent multiple spending. When a coin is spent, the spender uses his secret to create a valid response to a challenge from the payee.
The payee will verify the response before accepting the payment. The combined secret is a modular sum of the two shares, so one share of the secret reveals no information about the combined secret. Cooperation of the user and the observer is necessary in order to create a valid response to a challenge during a payment transaction. This is accomplished without either the user or the observer revealing any information about its share of the secret to the other.
It also prevents the observer from controlling the response; hence the observer cannot leak any information about the spender. However, this requires that the Bank or whoever is doing the tracing must be able to obtain the observer and analyze it. Also, not all types of observers can be used to trace transactions.
In any cryptographic system, there is some risk of a security failure. A security failure in an electronic cash system would result in the ability to forge or duplicate money. There are a number of different ways in which an electronic cash system could fail. One of the most serious types of failure would be that the cryptography the protocol or the underlying mathematics does not provide the intended security.
Anyone who is aware of the weakness could create coins that appear to come from a legitimate bank in the system. Another serious type of failure could occur in a specific implementation of the system. Even if the cryptography and the implementation are secure, the security could fail because of a physical compromise.
The above failure scenarios apply, not only to the electronic cash system, but also to the underlying authentication infrastructure. Any form of electronic commerce depends heavily on the ability of users to trust the authentication mechanisms. Thus the certification authorities need to be secured as thoroughly as do the banks.
All three of the basic schemes described in this paper are anonymous, which makes it impossible for anyone to connect a deposited coin to the originating banks withdrawal record of that coin. This property has serious consequences in the event of a security failure leading to token forgery. When a coin is submitted for deposit, it is impossible to determine if it is forged.
Even the originating bank is unable to recognize its own coins, preventing detection of the compromise. It is conceivable that the compromise will not be detected until the bank realizes that the total value of deposits of its electronic cash exceeds the amount that it has created with a particular key. At this point the losses could be devastating. After the key compromise is discovered, the bank will still be unable to distinguish valid coins from invalid ones since deposits and withdrawals cannot be linked.
The bank would have to change its secret key and invalidate all coins which were signed with the compromised key. The bank can replace coins that have not yet been spent, but the validity of untraceable coins that have already been spent or deposited cannot be determined without cooperation of the payer.
Payment untraceability prevents the Bank from determining the identity of the payer, and payer anonymity prevents even the payee from identifying the payer. It is possible to minimize this damage by limiting the number of coins affected by a single compromise. However, this kind of compartmentation reduces the anonymity by shrinking the pool of withdrawals that could correspond to a particular deposit and vice versa.
The anonymity properties of electronic cash pose several law enforcement problems because they prevent withdrawals and deposits from being linked to each other. We explained in the previous section how this prevents detection of forged coins. Anonymity also makes it difficult to detect money laundering and tax evasion because there is no way to link the payer and payee. One way to minimize these concerns is to require large transactions or large numbers of transactions in a given time period to be traceable.
This would make it more difficult to commit crimes involving large sums of cash. Also, limiting the amount spent in a given time period would have to rely on a tamper-resistant device. Another way to minimize these concerns is to provide a mechanism to restore traceability under certain conditions, such as a court order.
Traceability can be separated into two types by its direction. In other words, if a search warrant is obtained for Alice, forward tracing will reveal where Alice has spent her cash. Backward tracing will reveal who Alice has been receiving payments from.
A solution that conditionally restores both forward and backward traceability into the cut-and-choose scheme is presented by Stadler, Piveteau, and Camenisch in . In the basic cut-and choose scheme, an identifying number is associated with each withdrawal record and a different identifying number is associated with each deposit record, although there is no way to link these two records to each other. This encrypted withdrawal number is passed to the payee as part of the payment protocol, and then will be passed along to the bank when the coin is deposited by the payee.
The payer performs the encryption during the withdrawal transaction, but the bank can insure that the encryption was done properly. If the required conditions for tracing are met, the payment or deposit can be turned over to the trusted entity holding the secret key to decrypt the withdrawal number.
This withdrawal number will allow the bank to access its withdrawal records, identifying the payer. To provide a mechanism for restoring forward traceability, the payer must commit to a deposit number at the time that the coin is withdrawn. The bank is able to determine that the payer has not cheated, although it only sees the deposit number in encrypted form.
If the required conditions for tracing are met, the withdrawal record can be turned over to the trusted entity holding the secret key to decrypt the deposit number. The bank can use this deposit number to identify the depositor the payee. Stadler et al. This can be used to provide users with anonymity, while solving many of the law enforcement problems that exist in a totally untraceable system.
The ability to trace transactions in either direction can help law enforcement officials catch tax evaders and money launderers by revealing who has paid or has been paid by the suspected criminal. The ability to restore traceability does not solve one very important law enforcement problem: detecting forged coins.
Backwards tracing will help identify a forged coin if a particular payment or deposit or depositor is under suspicion. In that case, backwards tracing will reveal the withdrawal number, allowing the originating bank to locate its withdrawal record and verify the validity of the coin. However, if a forged coin makes its way into the system it may not be detected until the bank whose money is being counterfeited realizes that the total value of its electronic cash deposits using a particular key exceeds the values of its withdrawals.
The only way to determine which deposits are genuine and which are forged would require obtaining permission to decrypt the withdrawal numbers for each and every deposit of electronic cash using the compromised key. This would violate the privacy that anonymous cash was designed to protect. Unfortunately, the scheme of  is not efficient because it is based on the bulky cut-and-choose method.
However, it may be possible to apply similar ideas to restore traceability in a more efficient electronic cash scheme. This report has described several innovative payment schemes which provide user anonymity and payment untraceability. These electronic cash schemes have cryptographic mechanisms in place to address the problems of multiple spending and token forgery.
However, some serious concerns about the ability of an electronic cash system to recover from a security failure have been identified. Concerns about the impact of anonymity on money laundering and tax evasion have also been discussed. Because it is simple to make an exact copy of an electronic coin, a secure electronic cash system must have a way to protect against multiple spending.
If the system is implemented on-line, then multiple spending can be prevented by maintaining a database of spent coins and checking this list with each payment. If the system is implemented off-line, then there is no way to prevent multiple spending cryptographically, but it can be detected when the coins are deposited. Detection of multiple spending after-the-fact is only useful if the identity of the offender is revealed.
Cryptographic solutions have been proposed that will reveal the identity of the multiple spender while preserving user anonymity otherwise. Token forgery can be prevented in an electronic cash system as long as the cryptography is sound and securely implemented, the secret keys used to sign coins are not compromised, and integrity is maintained on the public keys. However, if there is a security flaw or a key compromise, the anonymity of electronic cash will delay detection of the problem.
Even after the existence of a compromise is detected, the Bank will not be able to distinguish its own valid coins from forged ones. This could be done by limiting the total value of coins issued with a particular key, but lowering these limits also reduces the anonymity of the system since there is a smaller pool of coins associated with each key.
The untraceability property of electronic cash creates problems in detecting money laundering and tax evasion because there is no way to link the payer and payee. To counter this problem, it is possible to design a system that has an option to restore traceability using an escrow mechanism. If certain conditions are met such as a court order , a deposit or withdrawal record can be turned over to a commonly trusted entity who holds a key that can decrypt information connecting the deposit to a withdrawal or vice versa.
This will identify the payer or payee in a particular transaction. However, this is not a solution to the token forgery problem because there may be no way to know which deposits are suspect. We have also looked at two optional features of off-line electronic cash: transferability and divisibility. Because the size of an electronic coin must grow with each transfer, the number of transfers allowed per coin must be limited. Also, allowing transfers magnifies the problems of detecting counterfeit coins, money laundering, and tax evasion.
Coins can be made divisible without losing any security or anonymity features, but at the expense of additional memory requirements and transaction time. In conclusion, the potential risks in electronic commerce are magnified when anonymity is present. Anonymity creates the potential for large sums of counterfeit money to go undetected by preventing identification of forged coins. Anonymity also provides an avenue for laundering money and evading taxes that is difficult to combat without resorting to escrow mechanisms.
Anonymity can be provided at varying levels, but increasing the level of anonymity also increases the potential damages. It is necessary to weigh the need for anonymity with these concerns. It may well be concluded that these problems are best avoided by using a secure electronic payment system that provides privacy, but not anonymity. Alfred J. Thanks to the authors , Thomas Vartanian and anonymous others. Check corrections page for updates. Se connecter. Forgot your password? Get help. Bitcoin BTC.
We will name the payee Bob. We will informally refer to the financial network as the Bank. The necessary security properties are: Privacy , or protection against eavesdropping. This is obviously of importance for transactions involving, e. User identification , or protection against impersonation.
Clearly, any scheme for electronic commerce must require that a user knows with whom she is dealing if only as an alias or credit card number. Message integrity , or protection against tampering or substitution. Nonrepudiation , or protection against later denial of a transaction.
This is clearly necessary for electronic commerce, for such things as digital receipts and payments. The last three properties are collectively referred to as authenticity.
A bitcoin user first coin cryptocurrency swaps 10, coins for two pizzas Early History of Cryptocurrency — to ENJ Is Set to Be Listed in Coincheck on January 26 A cryptocurrency, broadly defined, is First, though, Binance Coin is a utility cryptocurrency that operates as a payment method for the fees associated with trading on the Binance Exchange Starting out in crypto can feel daunting, but purchasing your first Bitcoin or any other altcoin is much easier than you think.
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FirstCoin has a current supply of ,, with 31,, Nakamoto is estimated to have mined about 1 million Bitcoin during , none of which have ever been used since Bitcoin: Bitcoin was the first and is the most commonly traded cryptocurrency to date. There has been an hourly dip by Crypto news everyday.
Established in First Coin Company is an official distributor of more than 25 mints from around the world and specializes in supplying a wide range of authentic modern world collectible legal tender silver and gold numismatic coins with unique designs and high collectible demand in retail and wholesale. Login or Registration First, though, a caveat: it is impossible for a list like this to be entirely comprehensive. First Mover flagged the possibility.
According to a report in Bitcoin Magazine, one of the earliest attempts at creating a cryptocurrency actually predates bitcoin's creation by about 20 years. Users are able to generate FRST through the process of mining. Mais avant toute chose, vous devez ouvrir un compte pour acheter et vendre des bitcoins. Avant de vous ruer sur le premier vendeur ne proposant pas de frais Paypal, un conseil faites bien attention au taux offert pour le prix du Bitcoin car la plupart des vendeurs prennent leur commission ici!
C'est une des plateformes les plus facile a utiliser en En moins de 10 minutes, vous pouvez vous lancer et ouvrir des positions sur Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, et plus encore. Pour ce qui concerne les retraits, eToro facture tout retrait 25 euros et il semble que de nombreux utilisateurs se plaignent de lutter pour liquider leurs actifs et retirer des fonds chez Etoro, raison pour laquelle je ne met pas cette plateforme plus en avant que cela sur mon site.
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Nakamoto is estimated to have mined about 1 million Bitcoin during , none of which have ever been used since Bitcoin: Bitcoin was the first and is the most commonly traded cryptocurrency to date. There has been an hourly dip by Crypto news everyday. Established in First Coin Company is an official distributor of more than 25 mints from around the world and specializes in supplying a wide range of authentic modern world collectible legal tender silver and gold numismatic coins with unique designs and high collectible demand in retail and wholesale.
Login or Registration First, though, a caveat: it is impossible for a list like this to be entirely comprehensive. First Mover flagged the possibility. According to a report in Bitcoin Magazine, one of the earliest attempts at creating a cryptocurrency actually predates bitcoin's creation by about 20 years.
Users are able to generate FRST through the process of mining. Loki cryptocurrency is a privacy coin built on the Monero codebase. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. First coin cryptocurrencywww.
No Comments. Post A Comment Cancel Reply. Leave this field empty. Comunicado Especial. C'est une des plateformes les plus facile a utiliser en En moins de 10 minutes, vous pouvez vous lancer et ouvrir des positions sur Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, et plus encore. Pour ce qui concerne les retraits, eToro facture tout retrait 25 euros et il semble que de nombreux utilisateurs se plaignent de lutter pour liquider leurs actifs et retirer des fonds chez Etoro, raison pour laquelle je ne met pas cette plateforme plus en avant que cela sur mon site.
Acheter du bitcoin avec Paypal via Paxful. Achat de bitcoins avec un Compte Paypal via LocalBitcoin. Acheter des bitcoins via EToro. Je ne recommande plus eToro en ! Bonjour et Bienvenue! Bitcoin BTC. Ethereum ETH. Tether USDT. Polkadot DOT.
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Pour comprendre comment fonctionne le Bitcoin, vous devez comprendre comment il est extrait. Partie 2 sur Soyez conscient de ses avantages. Partie 3 sur Stockez vos Bitcoins en ligne. Afin de stocker vos Bitcoins, vous devez commencer par configurer un site de stockage pour ces derniers.
Ce dernier est un dossier virtuel qui permet de faire fonctionner la devise et fait office de portemonnaie classique. Stockez vos Bitcoins via un tiers. Plusieurs sites proposent des portemonnaies papier. Partie 4 sur Partie 5 sur Utilisez Meetup. Partie 6 sur Les distributeurs de Bitcoins sont un concept relativement nouveau, mais ils sont de plus en plus nombreux.
Vous pouvez utiliser une carte en ligne pour trouver le plus proche de chez vous. Sortez du liquide de votre compte en banque.